Vito Pelino v. Kathryn Hens-Greco by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-15-2017 
Vito Pelino v. Kathryn Hens-Greco 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Vito Pelino v. Kathryn Hens-Greco" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 451. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/451 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
BLD-177        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1269 
___________ 
 
VITO A. PELINO, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JUDGE KATHRYN HENS-GRECO; NANCY  
AQUINO, (CYF Director); RAMONA TROY, (Supervisor);  
RAETONE MCKENZIE, (Caseworker) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-16-cv-01140) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 30, 2017 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
  Victor A. Pelino appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Pelino is a Pennsylvania state prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment for 
first-degree murder.  Upon Pelino’s arrest for murder in 2011, a state family court judge 
issued an order barring Pelino from contacting his two minor sons.  Later that year, the 
Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) filed a petition to 
terminate Pelino’s parental rights.  The family court held a hearing and granted that 
petition on October 26, 2011.  Pelino unsuccessfully appealed in state court. 
 In 2016, Pelino filed pro se the federal complaint at issue here.  He named as 
defendants the state court judge and three CYF employees, and he asserted claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants violated his constitutional rights.  Among other 
things, Pelino claimed that the judge made misrepresentations on the record, that CYF’s 
petition contained misrepresentations as well, and that one of the CYF employees lied 
under oath at the hearing.  Pelino sought both monetary damages and an order vacating 
the termination of his parental rights and granting him custody of his sons.1 
 All defendants filed motions to dismiss Pelino’s complaint on various grounds 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted those motions and dismissed  
Pelino’s complaint with prejudice.  The District Court concluded that, to the extent that  
                                              
1 After Pelino filed his complaint, he filed a “brief” in support of it.  The District Court 
considered the assertions contained in his brief, and we have considered them as well. 
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Pelino directly challenged the order terminating his parental rights, his complaint was 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2010).  The District Court also concluded 
that Pelino’s remaining claims against the state-court judge were barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment to the extent that he sued her in her official capacity, see Capogrosso v. S. 
Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam), and were barred by judicial 
immunity to the extent that he sued her in her individual capacity, see id. at 184.   
As for Pelino’s claims against the CYF defendants, the District Court concluded 
that they were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 claims 
arising in Pennsylvania.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  The 
District Court also concluded that those claims were barred by absolute immunity for 
CYF’s petitioning activity, see Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 
486, 493 (3d Cir. 1997), and that the testifying CYF employee was entitled to witness 
immunity as well, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983).  Finally, the 
District Court concluded than any amendment of Pelino’s complaint would be futile.  
Pelino appeals pro se.2 
II. 
 We will affirm for the reasons explained by the District Court.  Pelino raises  
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and will affirm if the complaint fails to 
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  See Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 185. 
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several arguments on appeal, but most them already are answered by the District Court’s 
analysis and do not require discussion.  We nevertheless briefly address four  
points.   
First, Pelino argues that the District Court overlooked his allegations of fraud and 
failed to mention them anywhere in its opinion.  The District Court was well aware of 
those allegations, however, and it specifically referenced them.  (ECF No. 22 at 2-3.) 
Second, Pelino argues that his allegations of fraud negate all grounds for 
dismissal, including the statute of limitations and immunity.  These arguments lack merit.  
Pelino argues that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5504(b) contains an exception to the statute of 
limitations for all claims of fraud.  That provision, however, merely authorizes courts to 
extend certain deadlines in cases of fraudulent concealment.  See Mariner Chestnut 
Partners, L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 280 n.9, 284 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).  Pelino does 
not argue that defendants concealed their alleged wrongdoing from him and that he could 
not reasonably have discovered it within two years.  Nor has Pelino raised any other 
potential ground for tolling.  
As for immunity, Pelino argues that defendants were not entitled to qualified 
immunity because (according to him) they knowingly violated the law.  The doctrines of 
immunity that the District Court properly applied, however, provide for absolute 
immunity, not qualified immunity.  See Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184 (judicial immunity); 
Ernst, 108 F.3d at 495 (CYF petitioning immunity); Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 (witness 
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immunity).  Thus, they apply even though Pelino alleges that defendants acted 
intentionally and maliciously.  See, e.g., Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184. 
Third, Pelino argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because he 
did not complain of any injuries caused by a state court judgment.  See Great W. Mining 
& Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166.  That is true to the extent that he complained merely of 
fraud during the hearing that led to the state court’s order terminating his parental rights.  
See id. at 171-72.  The District Court did not conclude otherwise and instead properly 
concluded that Pelino’s claims in that regard fail for the other reasons discussed above.  
In addition to his claims of fraud during the hearing, however, Pelino also expressly 
requested that the District Court vacate the order terminating his parental rights and 
award him custody of his sons.  As the District Court properly concluded, his complaint 
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the limited extent that he was seeking 
federal review of the state court’s order.  See id. at 166-67. 
Finally, Pelino argues that the District Court displayed bias by relying on case law 
that the defendants did not cite.  The District Court did not display any actual or apparent 
bias in discharging its obligation to apply the law.  
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
